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LESSONS FROM U.S. COASTAL WIND 
POOLS ABOUT CLIMATE FINANCE  
AND POLITICS 
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN* 
Abstract: The financial costs of extreme weather are profound, not only in 
terms of the distress of those immediately affected but also in broader, more 
long-term macroeconomic and public budgetary effects. This Article focuses 
on the role that private and public insurance can play, both positively and neg-
atively, on these effects. It also provides one of the most detailed analyses in 
the legal literature to date on the finances of three state residual-risk wind 
pools in the Gulf and Southeastern United States that have been created spe-
cifically with hurricane risks in mind. 
INTRODUCTION 
Insurance is the world’s largest industry because it offers products that 
are regarded as essential to financial resilience in the face of risk.1 But, as 
applied to the risk of loss from catastrophic weather, the role of the insur-
ance industry is mixed. On the one hand, the industry participates in global 
climate initiatives such as the United Nations December 2015 climate con-
ference in Paris, and offers products for weather-related risks through both 
traditional reinsurance markets and newer financial markets in catastrophe 
bonds (“cat bonds”) and other types of insurance-linked securities.2 On the 
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 1 See Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCI. 1040, 1040 (2005) (“As the 
world’s largest industry, the [insurance industry] would be the third largest country if its $3.2 
trillion in yearly revenues were compared with national gross domestic products . . . .”). 
 2 See GENEVA ASS’N, CLIMATE RISK STATEMENT OF THE GENEVA ASSOCIATION (2014) 
https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/878686/ga2014-climate-risk-statement.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X6T3-NN9V]; MUNICH RE, ROAD TO PARIS: 2015—A CRUCIAL YEAR FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
(2015), https://www.munichre.com/site/corporate/get/documents_E-1635640145/mr/assetpool.shared/
Documents/0_Corporate%20Website/1_The%20Group/Focus/Climate%20Change/munichre-road-
to-paris-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B99-UDN7]; J. David Cummins & Pauline Barrieu, Innova-
tions in Insurance Markets: Hybrid and Securitized Risk-Transfer-Solutions, in DIONNE’S HAND-
BOOK OF INSURANCE 547, 552 (2d ed. 2013) (although new issues of cat bonds dropped in 2008–
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other hand, at least in the United States, the insurance industry is largely 
absent from most primary climate-related markets. Since 1968, the insur-
ance industry in the United States has refused to cover flood losses.3 And in 
the early 21st Century, most major insurers have fled voluntary wind cover-
age just as surely as they fled flood insurance fifty years ago.4 There is a 
growing literature on flood insurance and, especially in the United States, 
on the National Flood Insurance Program that has replaced the private mar-
ket.5 But there has been much less written about wind insurance and the 
state-by-state residual risk programs that now dominate markets in hurri-
cane-prone regions of the Southeastern and Gulf states. This Article seeks to 
help fill that gap. 
I. WHY IT MATTERS: THE PERILS OF NOT GETTING THE FINANCING 
QUESTION RIGHT 
Before pivoting to state wind programs in the United States, it is help-
ful to step back and contemplate the worldwide consequences of not having 
in place a financial plan for weather catastrophes. Consider Hurricane Ivan 
and the economic effects of natural disasters on developing countries gener-
ally. Ivan came ashore in September 2004 as a Category 3 hurricane in both 
the United States and Grenada.6 In the United States, although it caused 
$22.5 billion in damages (in 2014 dollars) and registered as the sixth costli-
est hurricane in U.S. history, Hurricane Ivan only affected less than 0.2% of 
                                                                                                                           
2009, the market “recovered quickly and 2010 was the third largest year on record with new issu-
ance of $4.3 billion”); Giuseppe Turchetti et al., Natural and Man-Made Disasters: Challenges & 
International Perspective for Insurance, in INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE LAW 685, 697 
(Andrea de Guttry et al. eds., 2012). 
 3 See Donald T. Hornstein, The Balkanization of CAT Property Insurance: Financing and 
Fragmentation in Storm Risks, 11 RUTGERS J.L. PUB. POL’Y 9, 13–14 (“‘[W]ater’ or ‘flood’ ex-
clusions became standard in private, all-risk property insurance when the NFIP was created by the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.”). 
 4 See infra note 76 and accompanying text (describing how, as private insurers left voluntary 
wind markets, the rise of quasi-public coastal policies issued by state residual risk “insurers of last 
resort” grew by 1517 percent between 1990 and 2012). 
 5 See Ernest B. Abbott, Flood Insurance and Climate Change: Rising Sea Levels Challenge 
the NFIP, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10, 10 (2014); Sarah Fox, This Is Adaptation: The Elimi-
nation of Subsidies Under the National Flood Insurance Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 
205 (2014); Jennifer Wriggens, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in a 
Warming World, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 361, 361 (2014). 
 6 See ERIC. S. BLAKE & ETHAN J. GIBNEY, NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE, THE DEADLIEST, 
COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2010 (AND 
OTHER FREQUENTLY REQUESTED HURRICANE FACTS) 1, 9 (2011), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/
nws-nhc-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2HD-H537]; Angela Levins, Remembering Hurricane Ivan 10 
Years Later, the Storm That Wouldn’t Die, AL.COM (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://www.al.com/
news/mobile/index.ssf/2014/09/remembering_hurricane_ivan_10.html [https://perma.cc/23NA-Y2YJ]. 
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U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and the United States was easily able to 
absorb nationally the acute costs that the storm imposed regionally.7 In con-
trast, in Grenada, Ivan caused $900 million in damages, affecting almost 
200% of Grenada’s GDP, requiring the country to spend much of the next 
five years recovering from the direct effects of this single storm and result-
ing a decade later in Grenada’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio of 110%, leaving 
the country with “limited room to engage in public investments and social 
spending.”8 Hurricane Ivan’s effect on Grenada captures the effects, world-
wide, that natural disasters can have on developing economies.9 Thus, in 
2015, U.N. member states convened in Sendai, Japan for the Third World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, noting that dollars spent in disaster 
recovery are unavailable for poverty reduction, improved education, and 
food security—expenditures necessary to progress toward the U.N.’s (then-
proposed, now recently adopted) Sustainable Development Goals.10 
Countries with more developed economies are also at risk of long-term 
financial impacts. Although there is a fairly robust debate in the macroeco-
nomic literature about the long-term effects on GDP caused by losses due to 
violent weather, there are reasons to fear that cumulative expenditures on 
catastrophic weather, even in a highly developed country such as the United 
States, are far from benign.11 In 2012, the year Superstorm Sandy hit the 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See BLAKE & GIBNEY, supra note 6, at 9 tbl.3a; Hurricane Ivan, WORLD PUB. LIBRARY, 
http://www.worldlibrary.org/Article.aspx?ArticleId=0000961346&Title=hurricane%20ivan [https://
perma.cc/M6RE-RWTC]. Measured in 2004 dollars, Hurricane Ivan caused an estimated $18.82 
billion in damage in the United States, less than 0.2% of the U.S. GDP in 2004, which was ap-
proximately $12.27 trillion. See STACY R. STEWART, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CY-
CLONE REPORT: HURRICANE IVAN 1, 9 (2004), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092004_
Ivan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RYB-XA6P]; GDP at Market Prices (Current US$), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=2 [https://perma.cc/XBQ7-P9ZA]. 
 8 See About Grenada: Economy, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOV’T OF GRENADA (May 7, 
2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.gov.gd/economy.html [https://perma.cc/6PGS-WUKR]. 
 9 See Grenada Economy 2016, THEODORA.COM, http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/grenada/
grenada_economy.html [https://perma.cc/HB6K-PJH8] (citing 2016 WORLD FACT BOOK OF THE 
UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY). 
 10 See UNITED NATIONS, SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: 2015–2030, 
at 5–11 (2015), http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7JAW-63FY]; see also Donald T. Hornstein, The Insurance Industry on the Cusp of COP 21: 
Lessons from Flood Insurance Reform in the US and UK, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF CONSUMER 
FLOOD INSURANCE IN THE UK, REFLECTIONS UPON THE CREATION OF FLOOD RE 7, 7 (Johanna 
Hjalmarsson ed., 2015) (stating that worldwide, the problem is getting worse as uninsured losses 
exceed insured losses at an increasing rate, putting pressure on public expenditures, desperately 
needed elsewhere, to try to help fill the gap). 
 11 Compare Eric Strobl, The Economic Growth Impact of Hurricanes: Evidence from US 
Coastal Counties 2, 4 (IZA & Ecole Polytechnique, Discussion Paper No. 3619, 2008), http://ftp.
iza.org/dp3619.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VGW-LHCP] (“Hurricane strikes do not appear to be eco-
nomically important enough to be reflected in national economic growth rates.”), with Solomon 
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United States, the federal government made almost $100 billion in un-
planned expenditures for extreme weather events, representing that year’s 
single largest nondefense discretionary outlay, amounting to more than total 
federal expenditures that year for either transportation or education.12 Alt-
hough these federal budget outlays were unusually high in 2012, there ex-
ists in the United States (a) an internal political dynamic that results in an 
ever-escalating rate of presidential disaster declarations, (b) added to the 
ability and proclivity under current congressional budget rules to provide 
disaster payments through emergency appropriations outside of normal 
budget procedures or politically-imposed budget caps,13 (c) which occurs 
while there exists substantive rate suppression by which both federal flood-
insurance and state wind-insurance rates are kept below actuarially-fair lev-
els,14 (d) that results in the moral hazard of encouraging more development 
in at-risk areas,15 (e) which results in ever-escalating economic losses even 
                                                                                                                           
M. Hsiang & Amir S. Jina, The Causal Effect of Environmental Catastrophe on Long-Run Eco-
nomic Growth: Evidence from 6,700 Cyclones 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 20352, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20352.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ALK-2LHE] (“[W]e 
find robust evidence that national incomes decline, relative to their pre-disaster trend, and do not 
recover within twenty years. Both rich and poor countries exhibit this response . . . .”), and Goetz 
von Peter et al., Unmitigated Disasters? New Evidence on the Macroeconomic Cost of Natural 
Catastrophes (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 394, 2012), http://www.bis.org/
publ/work394.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHP6-K8BN] (“[M]ajor natural catastrophes have large and 
significant negative effects on economic activity, both on impact and over the longer run.”). See 
generally Julie Borowski, Recent Tornadoes and the Broken Window Fallacy, FREEDOMWORKS 
BLOG (June 2, 2011), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/recent-tornadoes-and-broken-window-
fallacy [https://perma.cc/8UZW-P68T] (explaining that suffering a natural disaster is not a boon to 
local economies). 
 12 See DANIEL LASHOF & ANDY STEVENSON, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHO PAYS FOR CLI-
MATE CHANGE? U.S. TAXPAYERS OUTSPEND PRIVATE INSURERS THREE-TO-ONE TO COVER CLI-
MATE DISRUPTION COSTS 3 (2013), http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/files/taxpayer-climate-
costs-IP.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AR7-YDEV] (“In 2012, the federal government spent $96 billion to 
clean up the disastrous effects of climate disruption.”). 
 13 See Philip O. Shapiro, Note, A Sustainable Budget Should Endure Any Storm, 17 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 595, 607–17, 610 n.80 (2014). 
 14 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather In-
surance 3–5 (U. Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 111, 2015), http://
repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1221&context=law_econ_current [https://
perma.cc/H7CE-6VRU] (“As a result of government intervention in property insurance markets, 
through either rate regulation or direct government provision of subsidized insurance, private 
markets no longer generate prices signals regarding the cost of living in severe weather regions. 
The cost of insurance is suppressed . . . .”). 
 15 See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 24 n.85 (“22 studies show an increase in disaster losses in 
recent decades, [with] 14 of them accredit[ing] conflating factors, including wealth/population 
increases in areas of weather-related risk . . . .”) (citing Laurens M. Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses 
Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate Change?, 92 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 39, 
41–42 (2011)); see also BLAKE & GIBNEY, supra note 6, at 6 (“Continued coastal growth and 
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if storm strength/frequency itself is no worse than that which existed histor-
ically,16 (f) and that definitely results in even-more-escalating economic 
losses when climate change affects sea levels or storm frequency/intensity,17 
such that (g) whatever the combinations of (a)-(f) the United States is as a 
factual matter already spending such an increasingly large part of the feder-
al budget for weather disasters that researchers at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research estimate that, over the next seventy-five years, it will 
require aggregate expenditures between $1.2–$7.1 trillion (depending on 
assumptions of growth and discount rates)—roughly the same level of ex-
penditure as that necessary in the United States over the same time period to 
keep Social Security solvent.18 Accordingly, even in a country as rich, geo-
graphically diversified, and financially sophisticated as the United States, if 
we stay with our current spending plan for catastrophic weather, it may in 
this century undermine our own ability to maintain our standard of living. 
In short, we’re roughly in the same boat as Grenada. Indeed, without getting 
its weather finances right, the whole world will be in the same boat as Gre-
nada. British economist Nicholas Stern estimates that, worldwide, govern-
ment expenditures for catastrophic weather by 2050 could range between 
$850 billion to $1.3 trillion annually.19 In a world in which there are no free 
lunches, this level of annual expenditure will come at the expense of eco-
nomic development and worldwide standards of living.20 
At this point, it is worth emphasizing how private insurance can im-
prove overall economic resilience, and why the world is worse off when it 
lacks functioning insurance markets to stand between human losses and 
governments-as-insurers-of-last-resort. First, to start with the obvious, the 
more private insurance is engaged, the more of a financial buffer exists be-
tween storm losses and the need for governmental expenditures.21 The Lon-
                                                                                                                           
inflation will almost certainly result in every future major landfalling hurricane (and even weaker 
hurricanes and tropical storms) replacing one of the current costliest hurricanes.”). 
 16 BLAKE & GIBNEY, supra note 6, at 6. 
 17 See Hsiang & Jina, supra note 11, at 3 (“It is expected that the frequency and intensity of 
cyclones will change in response to climate change, which our results indicate may have important 
economic consequences.”) (citations omitted). 
 18 See J. David Cummins et al., Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk, in 
MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 61, 63 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2010) (not-
ing that net present value of the unfunded liability of next 75 years’ worth of federal extreme 
weather expenditures to be between $1.2 trillion and $7.1 trillion, in comparison to the net present 
value over the same time period of a projected Social Security shortfall of $4.9 trillion). 
 19 See Donald T. Hornstein, Insurance at the Energy-Water Nexus, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1033, 
1041 (2014). 
 20 See Hsiang & Jina, supra note 11, at 1, 16 (“Both rich and poor countries exhibit this re-
sponse, with losses magnified in countries with less historical cyclone experience.”). 
 21 See Hornstein, supra note 10, at 7. 
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don Market Group reported in 2014 that, as to worldwide natural disasters, 
only about 25–30% of losses are insured, with 65–70% uninsured, a gap 
that is actually widening.22 This is an especially bad scenario in developing 
economies because, as was the case in Grenada, it means that more public 
money will be spent on disaster recovery and will therefore be less available 
for the public expenditures necessary to reach goals in education, public-
health, and poverty-reduction.23 More broadly, uninsured catastrophe losses 
have macroeconomic costs: they negatively affect economic growth where-
as “well-insured catastrophes . . . can be [financially] inconsequential or a 
positive for growth over the medium term as insurance payouts help fund 
reconstruction efforts.”24 
Second, a properly priced private insurance regime sends market signals 
to insureds to avoid particularly risky undertakings (because premium prices 
will skyrocket) and/or to adopt cost-effective precautionary measures that 
reduce risk.25 As one study found as to weather catastrophes, “[i]nsurance 
arrangements . . . contribute to prevention and disaster management ex ante,” 
for example, by providing incentives “to establish advanced building codes.”26 
Insurance payouts also are targeted at “those facilities that private agents had 
deemed important enough ex ante to warrant insurance coverage, often ones 
that serve a productive purpose.”27 This is one reason why catastrophe cover-
age via insurance is thought “to contribute more toward economic recovery 
than ex post compensation in the form of aid or government relief pro-
grams.”28 
In addition, the benefits from private insurance markets are magnified 
in a world where worst-case scenarios themselves are deteriorating. In the 
United States, for example, catastrophe models show that damages from 
previous storms that struck populated areas would today be much worse due 
to the increased numbers and higher values of at-risk properties.29 Similar 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See id. 
 23 See About Grenada: Economy, supra note 8. 
 24 See von Peter et al., supra note 11, at 1. 
 25 Haitao Yin et al., Does Private Insurance Reduce Environmental Accidents?, REG., Sum-
mer 2012, at 26, 37 (stating that an analogous effect was documented in a study by Haitao Yin, 
Howard Kunreuther, and Mathew White, where there was found to be a dramatic decline in leaks 
from underground fuel tanks when gas stations were required to carry private cleanup and liability 
insurance; the study found that the insurance pricing structure gave “[gas] tank owners economic 
incentives to invest in equipment that reduce[d] the chance of accidental fuel tank leaks”). 
 26 See von Peter et al., supra note 11, at 4, 16. 
 27 Id. at 21. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See KAREN CLARK & CO., INCREASING CONCENTRATIONS OF PROPERTY VALUES AND 
CATASTROPHE RISK IN THE US 5 (2015), http://www.karenclarkandco.com/news/publications/pdf/
KCC_Industry_Exposure_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/39L3-X6KE]; Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., 
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vulnerabilities are also reflected in an analysis of several meteorological 
near-misses. Thus, to return to Hurricane Ivan in 2004, at one point the 
storm was projected by tracking models to present a one-in-four chance of a 
“direct hit” on New Orleans which, had it occurred, could have imposed 
total losses in excess of $100 billion, an amount exceeded only by Hurri-
cane Katrina two years later, reducing the chances that New Orleans would 
have been rebuilt at all.30 A decade later, at the onset of the 2015 Atlantic 
hurricane season, disaster modelers predicted that if Miami were to be hit 
by a Category 5 storm (a storm with a 1-in-100 chance of occurring), the 
losses could cost $250 billion.31 There is a real danger of being thinly capi-
talized in the face of such an event, even to a political entity as vibrant as 
the State of Florida.32 In September 2008, when Hurricane Ike briefly 
threatened Miami with a Category 4 strike, an earlier warning from the 
Fitch ratings agency in March 2008 had already warned that if a major 
storm were to “hit[] Florida, ‘the fragile [insurance] market could effective-
ly collapse.’”33 
Having underscored the value of private insurance markets, however, 
how do we explain the flight from primary coverage of catastrophic weather 
risks by private insurers? In a word, the most frequently given rationale is 
that such risks are “uninsurable.”34 
                                                                                                                           
Catastrophe Losses Will Double About Every 10 Years, Says Leading Catastrophe Modeling 
Expert at PCS Conference (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.iii.org/press-release/catastrophe-losses-
will-double-about-every-10-years-says-leading-catastrophe-modeling-expert-at-pcs-conference-
042506 [https://perma.cc/5VHK-QYR8] (noting that one expert predicts that catastrophe storm 
losses could follow a perverse variation of Moore’s Law and “double about every ten years due to 
increases in the numbers and values of properties at risk”). 
 30 See Shirley Laska, What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans?, 78 SOC. IN-
QUIRY 2, 174, 177–78 (2008); Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/9KJZ-
HRNC] (citing FEMA’s estimate that Hurricane Katrina caused $108 billion in damages). 
 31 See Ryan Yousefi, 100-Year Hurricane Could Cost $250 Billion if It Hit Miami, MIAMI NEW 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/100-year-hurricane-could-
cost-250-billion-if-it-hit-miami-7572520 [https://perma.cc/98DX-3TJ5]. 
 32 See Michael Grunwald, Could Florida Survive the Big One?, TIME (Sept. 5, 2008), http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1839219,00.html. 
 33 Id.; Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Comments on Florida Homeowners Insurance Market 
(Mar. 24, 2008, 11:28 AM), https://www.fitchratings.com/site/fitch-home/pressrelease?id=413634 
[https://perma.cc/GN8W-825A]. 
 34 See Véronique Bruggeman et al., Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation 
of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 194 (2012) 
(catastrophe insurance needs to be bundled with ordinary car and home insurance because other-
wise damage from catastrophic events “would normally be considered uninsurable”). 
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II. WHY WE LACK PROPERLY FUNCTIONING PRIVATE  
INSURANCE MARKETS FOR CATASTROPHIC WEATHER— 
THE STANDARD ECONOMIC ARGUMENT 
When insurers claim that weather catastrophes are “uninsurable,” they 
typically mean that the normal risk-transferring advantages of insurance do 
not apply when catastrophes occur.35 Insurance works best when the under-
lying risks are randomized and independent because it offers a win-win 
proposition for both buyer and seller.36 Take, for example, a woman con-
templating automobile liability insurance. The buyer (driver) does not know 
whether she will get into an auto accident in the upcoming year, let alone 
whether she might cause the accident; thus, the “variance” that she will suf-
fer a financial loss is high.37 But she knows that there is some chance that 
she might cause an accident with resulting personal injury or property dam-
age, potentially exposing her to legal costs and thousands of dollars of lia-
bility.38 The insurer, although also not knowing whether this particular driv-
er will cause an accident, nonetheless knows statistically to a very level of 
confidence how many accidents overall are likely to occur in the territories 
it insures.39 Because of the law of large numbers, the variance in the statis-
tical likelihood of accidents overall is quite low; that is, the number is very 
predictable.40 The insurer also knows statistically the overall expected costs 
of those accidents and the overall expected costs of providing legal repre-
sentation to its insureds.41 Based on this information, the insurer knows how 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1109 (2015) (“Insurers justify their refusal to insure catastrophic risks such 
as earthquakes on the basis that the losses are essentially ‘uninsurable’ because the risks of loss 
are highly correlated . . . .”). 
 36 See J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 88 
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 337 (2006) (“Insurance works best for high-frequency, low-
severity events, which are statistically independent and have probability distributions that are 
reasonably stationary over time.”). 
 37 See JUDY FELDMAN ANDERSON & ROBERT L. BROWN, EDUCATION & EXAMINATION 
COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, RISK AND INSURANCE 4 (2005) (in the case of an 
automobile driver’s risk, “if we look at a particular individual, we see that there can be an ex-
tremely large variation in possible outcomes”). 
 38 See id. 
 39 See Cummins, supra note 36, at 342 (“Intuitively, the law of large numbers says that the 
sample mean becomes arbitrarily close to the population mean as the sample size increases. Thus, 
the expected loss is highly predictable in a sufficiently large sample.”). 
 40 Id. at 342–43 (“The U.S. market for personal automobile insurance is an example of a lo-
cally insurable market.”). 
 41 See ANDERSON & BROWN, supra note 37, at 4–5 (“[I]f an insurer sells n policies to n indi-
viduals, it assumes the total risk of n individuals. In reality, the risk assumed by the insurer is 
smaller in total than the sum of the risks associated with each individual policyholder.”). 
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much money it needs to collect from insureds to cover its expected losses—
the actuarially fair price.42 
In this sense, insurance is one of the world’s oldest applications of 
“Big Data,” an attribute of the industry facilitated by its partial exemption 
from antitrust laws specifically to allow insurance companies to gather and 
share data collectively so that actuarially fair prices can be determined.43 
Because it is worth it to insureds to pay a “premium” over the actuarially 
fair price to transfer the high-variance, worst-case risk of a financial wipe-
out to the insurer—which “smoothes” the risk by spreading it across thou-
sands or tens of thousands of other, similarly situated insureds—both sides 
of the exchange profit.44 Thus, conventional economics predicts that insur-
ance will emerge because rational, self-interested individuals will find it 
advantageous to pay the premium, and rational, self-interested organizations 
will find it profitable to enter the business.45 And, certainly, there is ample 
empirical evidence that the conventional economic explanation is predic-
tive: by many metrics, insurance is the largest industry in the world, with 
annual premium income of $3.2 trillion.46 
Storm losses, however, are different—or so claims the conventional 
economic dogma.47 Here, the variance is high(er) for both insured and in-
surer.48 For insureds, the chance that their property will be affected in any 
given year by, say, a hurricane, is both uncertain and rare, triggering the 
well-documented tendency of many people to discount such risks via non-
rational heuristics and mental biases against low-probability/high-risk 
events (it won’t happen to me).49 Thus, the market for storm insurance will 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id. at 2–5. 
 43 See Anthony J. Alt, Congress’ Self-Inflicted Sisyphean Task: The Insurance Industry’s 
Federal Antitrust Exemption and the Insurance Industry Competition Acts of 2007 and 2009, 16 
CONN. INS. L.J. 399, 418 (2010) (“The purpose of the . . . antitrust exemption was to allow for 
cooperative rate-making efforts among insurance companies so that they could ‘underwrite risks 
in an informed and responsible way’ . . . .”). 
 44 See Cummins, supra note 36, at 342 (“Individuals are averse to pure risk and are willing to 
pay amounts greater than the expected value of losses in return for transferring risk to an insur-
er.”). 
 45 See id. (“The amounts greater than expected losses that individuals and businesses are will-
ing to pay for risk transfer give rise to gains from trade that have motivated the development of the 
insurance and reinsurance industries.”). 
 46 See Mills, supra note 1, at 1040 (“As the world’s largest industry, the [insurance industry] 
would be the third largest country if its $3.2 trillion in yearly revenues were compared with na-
tional gross domestic products . . . .”). 
 47 See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Com-
parative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 605–10 (1992) (collecting typologies and sources 
of these types of mental errors). 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
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be less vigorous than for risks that are viewed as more routine.50 Data on 
penetration rates of hurricane insurance in the United States bear this out.51 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, evidence indicates that approximate-
ly 40% of those suffering losses had failed to purchase adequate—or any—
flood insurance.52 
But it is also the case that storm losses are different even for statistical-
ly-minded insurers, who do not themselves rush to offer storm insurance. 
One reason is that, from a Big Data perspective, the methodologies for cal-
culating future storm losses are more fraught than mining data for common 
events such as automobile accidents. For example, in hurricane-insurance 
rate setting at both the federal and state levels, it was customary to project 
future losses by using a simple historical baseline, going back twenty or 
thirty years, to obtain average losses that were assumed to represent the 
likely outcome in the near future.53 The failure of this approach to reflect 
real-world changes in both the value of insured properties (more recent ex-
tensive and expensive development at the coast) and changes in hurricane 
frequency or intensity was captured in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew 
caused the insolvencies of ten Florida insurers and led to years of rapid rate 
increases, insurer abandonment of coastal insurance altogether, or both.54 
Although insurers and regulators began using more long-term climatology 
models to capture a bigger statistical picture, Hurricane Katrina’s $45 bil-
lion in insured losses in 2005 still exceeded the losses that those models had 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-7, NATURAL DISASTERS: PUBLIC 
POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN NATIONAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 
25 (2007) (describing how of 60,196 homes with severe wind damage from hurricanes in 2005, 
38% did not have insurance against wind loss); Dwight Jaffee et al., Long Term Insurance (LTI) 
for Addressing Catastrophe Risk 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14210, 
2008) (considering both wind and flood insurance, 41% of damaged homes from the 2005 hurri-
canes in the United States were uninsured or underinsured). 
 51 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 50, at 25; James A. Knox Jr., Cau-
sation, the Flood Exclusion, and Katrina, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 901, 911 (2006); 
Jaffee et al., supra note 50, at 4. Of the NFIP-eligible homes in the New Orleans area, only 30% 
had flood insurance. Knox, supra. 
 52 See Knox, supra note 51, at 911. 
 53 See Sarah M. Tran, Updated Hurricane Models: A New Opportunity to Insure Against 
Climate Change, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH L. 73, 85 (2008) (“Under the traditional approach . . . 
regulators determine what they consider to be reasonable rates for a given exposure by averaging 
annual statewide loss data over approximately twenty to thirty years.”). 
 54 See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that between 2001 and 2006, rates for homeown-
ers’ insurance in Florida rose 77%); Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance and Catastrophe in the 
Case of Katrina and Beyond, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 49, 52–53 (2006–2007) (discussing Florida 
insolvencies); see also Tran, supra note 53, at 86 (“[T]he shortcomings of using historical premi-
um and loss experience with respect to catastrophes like hurricanes are clear.”). 
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predicted.55 In turn, this has led to the use of statistical models that are more 
sensitive to very recent changes in coastal property valuations as well as to 
meteorological trends, such as El Niño events or climate change, that can 
make future weather different from the past.56 Most insurers outsource this 
element of Big Data to private modeling consultants such as Risk Manage-
ment Solutions (“RMS”) or AIR Worldwide (“AIR”) who use propriety 
models that carry with them their own complications: skepticism by rate-
payers and insurance regulators, as well as their uncertain effect on ratings 
by agencies such as A.M. Best, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s on which in-
surers depend for access to capital.57 
Finally, even if actual hurricane losses could be reliably predicted, it can 
be difficult for insurers to smooth them across insurance pools, thus avoiding 
unexpected losses and potential insolvency. First, because storm losses occur 
across entire neighborhoods and regions, the losses are neither randomized 
nor independent, but instead are “correlated” losses requiring payoffs all at 
once and therefore posing particular threats to insurers’ capital.58 Second, be-
cause insurance is typically offered, and regulated, intra-state, there can be 
geographic limitations to the insurance pools across which insurers can 
spread their correlated losses.59 As importantly, the local nature of insurance 
regulation makes state insurance commissioners, who regulate the rates insur-
ers can charge for storm risks, subject to political pressure from voters whose 
cognitive dissonance predisposes them to downplay storm risks in the first 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Tran, supra note 53, at 88. 
 56 See Carolyn Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, The Unholy Trinity: Fat Tails, Tail Dependence, 
and Micro-Correlations 1 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 09-36-REV, Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-09-36-REV.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YNW8-UMMV] (standard diversification approaches to risk can fail “when loss distributions are 
characterized by fat tails, tail dependence, or micro-correlations”). 
 57 Tran, supra note 53, at 88 (“The closed nature of these models could potentially impede 
regulators’ ability to determine the reasonableness of the filed rates.”); see, e.g., ILL. DEP’T OF 
INS., FINDING A REPUTABLE INSURANCE COMPANY: USING FINANCIAL RATING AGENCIES 1 
(2009) (urging consumers to use financial visibility data compiled on insurers by such ratings 
agencies as A.M. Best, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s); Chad Hemenway, Cat Modeling: Ingrained 
in the Industry, Embroiled in Controversy, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.
propertycasualty360.com/2011/03/18/cat-modeling-ingrained-in-the-industry-embroiled-i (noting 
that the 2011 RMS model increased hurricane risks almost overnight by 150 percent); see also 
Karen Clark, How Can Rating Agencies Better Gauge Carrier Cat-Risk Exposure?, PROPERTY 
CASUALTY 360° (May 16, 2011), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/05/16/how-can-rating-
agencies-better-gauge-carrier-cat- (“The rating agencies are not making consistent comparisons 
across companies with respect to catastrophe risk.”). 
 58 See Cummins, supra note 36, at 343 (“If risks are dependent, the amount of equity capital 
needed per risk to achieve a given insolvency target becomes [greater] . . . .”). 
 59 See Alt, supra note 43, at 400–02 (explaining how the federal 1946 McCarran-Ferguson 
Act makes “the business of insurance” the province of state, not federal, regulation). 
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place, and who will criticize insurers’ arguments for rate increases to the ex-
tent that they are based upon proprietary risk data given to them by consult-
ants such as AIR or RMS, data that is not particularly transparent.60 Insurers 
routinely cite all of these reasons—the standard economic dogma—when 
they claim that storm risks are “uninsurable.”61 And, empirically, insurers do 
seem to put their money where their mouth is. Since 1968, insurers in the 
United States have in fact excluded flood losses from standardized cover-
age.62 In the section below, I turn to wind. 
III. WIND INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHEASTERN  
AND GULF STATES 
A. The State of the Private Market 
If there is a private market for wind insurance in the Southeastern and 
Gulf states, most large private insurers want little part of it. Since 2004, All-
state Insurance (the “good hands” people) has dropped approximately 
320,000 policies with wind exposure in Florida, 12,000 policies in South 
Carolina, and announced that it would not write new policies in Maryland and 
Virginia.63 In 2009, Nationwide Insurance (“on your side”) dropped 60,000 
coastal properties in Florida.64 In 2008, Farmers Insurance (“Insurance Uni-
versity”) threatened to leave North Carolina markets altogether rather than be 
forced to participate in the state’s coverage of coastal wind risks, and in 
2011–2012, the Farm Bureau of North Carolina followed suit by significantly 
reducing its residential wind writings at the coast.65 Even those insurers who 
remain increasingly offer “hollow[ed] out” coverage with higher deductibles 
and co-payments and lower overall policy limits, thereby effectively forcing 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Tran, supra note 53, at 88 (“[S]ome consumer advocates fear that insurance companies 
could use the proprietary nature of the models to raise rates unscrupulously.”). 
 61 See, e.g., French, supra note 35, at 1109 (insurers claim catastrophic risks are uninsurable). 
 62 See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
 63 See ENVTL. DEF., BLOWN AWAY: HOW GLOBAL WARMING IS ERODING THE AVAILABILITY 
OF INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA’S COASTAL CITIES 17 (2007), http://emerginglitigation.
shb.com/Portals/f81bfc4f-cc59-46fe-9ed5-7795e6eea5b5/7301_BlownAway_insurancereport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CVQ9-R29V]; Amy Clark, Allstate’s ‘Good Hands’ Wave ‘Bye Bye,’ CBS NEWS 
(Dec. 21, 2006, 6:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/allstates-good-hands-wave-bye-bye/ [https://
perma.cc/K6TA-UWAK]. 
 64 See Jeff Harrington, Insurer to Drop 60,000, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at 1B. 
 65 See Michael Adams, North Carolina Farm Bureau to Raise Homeowners’ Rates, Drop 
Policies, INS. J. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2012/02/27/
237291.htm [https://perma.cc/3VCV-DYYG]; Brian H. Kern, Farmers Insurance to Pull Out of 
North Carolina Homeowners’ Market, INS. J. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/southeast/2008/08/14/92787.htm [https://perma.cc/R46M-2N6U]. 
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insureds to pay more for less.66 In Florida, when an unprecedented sequence 
of four hurricanes swept the state in 2004, those who had insurance bore be-
tween fifteen and twenty percent of the financial losses.67 
B. The Rise of Quasi-Public State Residual-Risk Wind Pools 
In the place of an effective private market, there has arisen a political 
market for governmental action. Mindful of the fact that 53% of the U.S. 
population lives at or near coastal areas (voters), politically mindful coastal 
states have created public programs known generically either as “FAIR” 
plans (“Fair Access to Insurance Requirements”), Joint Underwriting Asso-
ciations, or Wind Pools.68 In 2002, Florida created the Citizens Property 
Insurance Corporation.69 In 2003, Louisiana created the Louisiana Citizens 
Property Insurance Association.70 Texas has created the Texas Windstorm 
Insurance Association, Mississippi the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting 
Authority, and South Carolina its Wind and Hail Underwriting Associa-
tion.71 These plans, and others, typically reflect the structure of “residual” 
or “assigned risk” pools in which the state conditions the right to sell insur-
ance in the state with (forced) participation in these high-risk pools.72 Alt-
hough the constitutionality of such structures has been questioned by some, 
including Professor Richard Epstein, state courts have rejected challenges 
that the arrangements constitute takings requiring compensation under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and have 
similarly rejected challenges that the arrangements violate substantive due 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S INCRED-
IBLE DISAPPEARING WEATHER CATASTROPHE RISK: HOW INSURERS HAVE SHIFTED RISK AND 
COST ASSOCIATED WITH WEATHER CATASTROPHES TO CONSUMERS AND TAXPAYERS 1–4 (2012), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/InsuranceRegulationHurricaneRiskDisappearingCoverageStudy
2-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6ES-SF3Q]. 
 67 See EVAN MILLS ET AL., CERES, AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF INSURANCE UNDER 
CLIMATE CHANGE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. 5 (2005), http://www.c2es.org/doc
Uploads/Ceres%20--%20Insurance%20&%20Climate%20Change%202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SFS6-4ECG]. 
 68 AM. INS. ASS’N, WHAT ARE “RESIDUAL MARKETS” FOR PROPERTY INSURANCE? (n.d.), 
http://www.aiadc.org/File%20Library/Resources/Industry%20Resources/PROPERTY---National-
---Residual-Market-Descriptions-White-Paper-295953.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KP-5JNM]; KRISTEN 
M. CROSSETT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE 
COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980–2008, at 1 (2004), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb/
pdfs/coastal_pop_trends_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3H3-YGVT]. 
 69 See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6) (2015).  
 70 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:2293 (2015). 
 71 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-34-3 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-90-810 to -890 (2015); 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2210.001 to .705 (West 2015). 
 72 See generally TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 624–34 (3d 
ed. 2013) (describing generally the structure of residual risk insurance programs). 
358 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:345 
process.73 Initially created as “insurers of last resort” for homeowners who 
could not find affordable (or any) private coverage, these programs soon 
came to dominate the market for wind insurance in Southeastern and Gulf 
states. Florida Citizens had, by 2007, become Florida’s largest insurer of 
first resort and the fourth-largest property insurer in the nation.74 The North 
Carolina Coastal Property Insurance Pool covers approximately 70% of the 
State’s beach properties.75 Nationally, compared to $55 billion in insured 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191, 207 (N.J. 1991) (“Since we hold 
that the [arrangement in question] does not, on its face, impose a confiscatory taking, a fortiori we 
find that it meets the minimal requirements for constitutionality under a substantive due process 
analysis.”); id. at 198–99 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)) (“[T]he guar-
anty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to 
be attained.”); see also Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Harnett, 426 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) aff’d 431 U.S. 934 (“Regulation of the insurance industry, in order to provide adequate 
protection of the public, is surely a proper subject for the state’s exercise of its police power . . . . 
The law accomplishes a legitimate public goal and any contract right must yield to it.”); People ex 
rel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 414 N.Y.S.2d 823, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (“[I]t is, there-
fore, unnecessary to determine the further issue of whether the Superintendent’s application of 
[the laws at issue] has crossed the threshold of appropriating the defendants’ property without just 
compensation . . . .”); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federal-
ism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 298 (1999); Steven Plitt & Daniel Maldonado, When 
Constitutional Challenges to State Cancellation Moratoriums Enacted After Catastrophic Hurri-
canes Fail: A Call for a New Federal Insurance Program, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 41, 64 (2012) (“In-
surance companies can also argue that any statutory or regulatory scheme which precludes an 
insurance company from allocating the company’s resources as it sees fit, forcing it to suffer net 
economic losses both within and outside the Gulf states, results in a taking of its “property” with-
out just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment . . . . Any showing that beneficial use 
has been denied will fail because any “compelled” insurance contract would still belong to the 
insurer and policyholders would still pay the insurance company all required premiums.”). 
 74 Tom Zucco & Jennifer Liberto, Citizens’ Business Booms, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 26, 
2007), http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/26/Business/Citizens__business_bo.shtml [https://perma.
cc/7ZFN-KE5C] (“Citizens currently has about 1.3-million homeowner policies, and its commer-
cial business is growing by 1,000 percent this year. That makes Citizens the fourth-largest proper-
ty insurer in the nation.”); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(b) (2015) (“It is the intent of 
the Legislature that the rates for coverage provided by the association be actuarially sound and not 
competitive with approved rates charged in the admitted voluntary market such that the associa-
tion functions as a residual market mechanism to provide insurance only when the insurance can-
not be procured in the voluntary market.”); see Jean Gruss, The Insurer of First Resort, BUS. OB-
SERVER (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.businessobserverfl.com/section/detail/the-insurer-of-first-resort/ 
[https://perma.cc/U9AC-CSUD] (“When it was created after Andrew, Citizens was supposed to be 
the insurer of last resort . . . . Today, the state-owned agency has become the largest residential-
property insurer in Florida . . . .”). 
 75 LRC COMM. ON PROP. INS. RATE MAKING, MINUTES: NOVEMBER 2, 2011, at 8 (2011), http://
www.ncga.state.nc.us/DocumentSites/Committees/PIRMC/2011-November%2002/Approved%20
Minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRU9-Z9P2]. 
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assets in such plans in 1990, state-run residual risk plans had by 2012 over 
$880 billion in loss exposure, an increase of 1517 percent.76 
IV. HOW STATE WIND POOLS ARE FINANCED 
Not all state residual programs are structured identically, and many of 
them are still undergoing periods of significant experimentation and revi-
sion. The merits of these programs are difficult to evaluate in a vacuum. 
Even though “market-making” institutions in general may be lauded as cre-
ative ways in which government can interact with markets, in the case of 
these particular residual-market insurance mechanisms, their link to actual 
public-welfare improvements depends on the details. 
This Section analyzes three such programs: those adopted in North 
Carolina, Texas, and Florida. The North Carolina Coastal Property Insur-
ance Pool reflects an approach that, having undergone significant legislative 
reform in 2009, utilizes a pay-it-forward financial structure designed to 
have in place, at the beginning of each new hurricane season, financial cov-
erage in the event of a 1-in-100-year probable-maximum-loss (“PML”), the 
standard target for catastrophic insurance used by private insurers in the 
United States.77 The Texas Windstorm Insurance Association reflects a dif-
ferent financial strategy, one that depends mostly on the Association’s abil-
ity to float post-event bonding in the event of a catastrophe.78 And the Flor-
ida Citizens Property Insurance Association reflects an entity that in some 
ways has been the most experimental of all wind pools. At times, it covers 
excess risk with both post-event financing and use of a uniquely Floridian 
in-state reinsurance facility, and more recently by use of the most aggres-
sive depopulation, or “take-out” program, in the country, seeking to encour-
age and even subsidize the emergence of a new type of private insurance 
market for catastrophic-wind risk, and to shed policies into it.79 
                                                                                                                           
 76 ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS. INFO. INST., RESIDUAL MARKET PROPERTY 
PLANS: FROM MARKETS OF LAST RESORT TO MARKETS OF FIRST CHOICE 3 (2014), http://www.
iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/paper_residualmarketupdate_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6R5-
BLLG]. 
 77 See generally N.C. INS. UNDERWRITING ASS’N, COASTAL PROPERTY INSURANCE POOL: 
MANUAL OF RULES AND PROCEDURES (2015), http://www.ncjua-nciua.org/DocLib/Operational
Docs/CPIP_MOR.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKG9-PBUN] (detailing guidelines for the NCIUA); see 
also KAREN CLARK & CO., supra note 29, at 1 (noting that the 1-in-100-year PML is the insurance 
industry’s standard, but that it may nonetheless significantly understate the true financial risks of 
catastrophic weather). 
 78 See infra notes 147–170 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 171–203 and accompanying text. 
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A. The North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Association 
Created by the North Carolina General Assembly in 1969, the North 
Carolina Insurance Underwriting Association (“NCIUA” or the “Associa-
tion”) is not a state agency.80 Instead, it is a nonprofit entity tasked with 
providing “as an insurer of last resort” property insurance (including wind 
coverage) for residential and commercial properties on North Carolina’s 
Barrier Islands and on the most exposed parts of the State’s coastal coun-
ties.81 Half of the NCIUA’s board of directors are elected by the insurance 
industry with the other half appointed by the state insurance commissioner 
from among independent insurance agents or the public.82 The NCIUA does 
not set insurance rates for coverage, a task in North Carolina that belongs to 
the N.C. Insurance Commissioner and the N.C. Rate Bureau.83 Participation 
in the NCIUA is mandatory for all insurers offering property insurance an-
ywhere in the state, regardless of whether they write coverage at the coast.84 
But participation in annual profits and losses from coastal coverage reflect-
ed each insurer’s pro rata share of the overall state market.85 Thus, in the 
case of a $10 million overall loss in coastal coverage (a stormy year), a 
company with a 5% market share of the overall state property insurance 
market would be given an “assessment,” requiring it to reimburse the NCI-
UA $500,000 (5% of the overall loss). Until 2009, insurers would also simi-
larly share in profitable years, dividing underwriting profits in quiet years 
(few storms).86 The Association’s books were settled annually, with assess-
ments or disbursements based on a designated, prior “storm” year (e.g., the 
Association’s accounts for 2006 would be settled for storms occurring in 
calendar year 2001), allowing a sufficient lag time to reflect all disburse-
ments and final accountings for losses in the storm year, and to allow the 
Association to carry forward enough retained earnings to operate in the up-
coming year.87 There were provisions to incentivize insurers to write cover-
age directly on coastal properties by giving them “credit” against any annu-
                                                                                                                           
 80 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-10 (2015) (creating the NCIUA). 
 81 See id. 
 82 See N.C. INS. UNDERWRITING ASS’N, PLAN OF OPERATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA INSUR-
ANCE UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION 13–14 (2015), http://www.ncjua-nciua.org/DocLib/Operational
Docs/CPIP_PO.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSF2-MGM2]. 
 83 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-15; see also N.C. INS. UNDERWRITING ASS’N, supra note 82, 
at 8 (showing how rates are calculated). 
 84 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-10. 
 85 See id. § 58-45-25(a). 
 86 See id. 
 87 See id. § 58-36-10(3) (“In the case of property insurance rates under this Article, considera-
tion may be given to the experience of property insurance business during the most recent five-
year period for which that experience is available.”). 
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al assessments they owed as members of the Association for properties they 
insured directly as individual insurers.88 This was not unimportant, as there 
was no limit to the amount of overall losses for which members could be 
assessed.89 Thus, in the event of a $1 billion loss, an insurer with a 
statewide 5% market share could be assessed $50 million. The ability of 
insurers to immediately pass on this assessment to policyholders statewide 
was not assured, and required approval of the (elected) state insurance 
commissioner.90 
Prior to significant legislative redesign in 2009, Figure 191 below illus-
trates the NCIUA’s financial structure—what regulators and insurers refer 
to as its “tower” —for financing storm losses in calendar year 2008, the last 
year before new legislation took effect.   
                                                                                                                           
 88 See id. § 58-45-25(b). 
 89 See id. § 58-45-25(a) (“Each member of the Association shall participate in the expenses, 
profits, and losses of the Association in the proportion that its net direct premium written in this 
State during the preceding calendar year for residential and commercial properties outside of the 
beach and coastal areas bears to the aggregate net direct premiums written in this State during the 
preceding calendar year for residential and commercial properties outside of the beach and coastal 
areas by all members of the Association, as certified to the Association by the Commissioner.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 90 See id. § 58-45-25(b). 
 91 Email from Alvin Ashworth, NCIUA Director of Finance and Accounting, to author (Apr. 
10, 2014) (on file with author). 
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There are three features of Figure 1 that are noteworthy. First, there are 
problems with the “top” of the tower. NCIUA financing projected funds 
capable of covering an annual loss of only $2.4 billion, a loss predicted to 
occur once every 49 years.92 In contrast, the industry norm is (and was then) 
to have in place financing for a one-in-one-hundred-year storm (known as 
“probable maximum loss” or the “100-year PML”).93 Although, as previ-
ously mentioned, there was no statutory limit on the ability of the Associa-
tion to impose assessments on member companies in the event of storm 
losses beyond the 1-in-49-year PML, it is revealing that the member com-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See North Carolina House, Senate Agree on Beach Plan Insurance Bill, INS. J. (Aug. 6, 2009), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2009/08/06/102828.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y4G-
WLZD]; see also Chad Hemenway, N.C. Beach Plan Reform Bill Advances in House; Assessment 
Concerns Remain, INSURANCENEWSNET.COM: PROPERTY & CASUALTY NEWS (July 15, 2009, 3:09 
PM), https://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/NC-Beach-Plan-Reform-Bill-Advances-in-House-
Assessment-Concerns-Remain-a-108045 [https://perma.cc/9LPM-YHCK] (“[T]he Beach Plan is 
responsible for financing the payment of losses that exceed the total from surplus . . . and reinsur-
ance (currently about $2.4 billion.”). 
 93 KAREN CLARK & CO., supra note 29, at 1 (“Insurers typically manage their potential catas-
trophe losses to the 100-year PMLs . . . .”). 
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panies refused to specifically demarcate that possibility on the NCIUA’s 
2008 financing plan.94 
 Second, there is weakness, or at least ambiguity, in the “bottom” of 
the tower.95 The bottom of the tower reflects financing for the first $1.1 bil-
lion in losses, amounts of loss that were the most likely to occur.96 Yet the 
tower does not identify any concrete dollar amount of retained earnings that 
were available (effectively in cash) to handle these losses.97 Rather, the bot-
tom and the left side of the tower reflects the Association’s ability to obtain 
money from member companies, if needed, by “assessments.” Although 
there were certainly several hundreds of millions of dollars in retained earn-
ings that the Association would have on hand going into calendar year 2008 
to cover losses, it is revealing that the financing tower does not specify pre-
cisely how much money the Association carried over into 2008 (and there-
fore didn’t take out as underwriting profit in 2007 to distribute among 
member companies) and how much it attributed to its ability to raise by as-
sessment, if needed.98 This reflects the possibility that, even as to a 1-in-49-
year PML, the Association could have faced a short-term liquidity problem 
after a catastrophe.99 
Third, there is both strength and weakness in the tower’s middle lay-
ers.100 On the positive side, the middle layers of the Association’s tower 
reflect the Association’s use of reinsurance which, generally speaking, is an 
increasingly common and acceptable way of advance financing for contin-
gent risks.101 Just to illustrate the general points made earlier in the Article, 
in the second layer, one can see that the Association had negotiated and pre-
paid for a reinsurer who would cover a layer of $300 million by providing 
“80% of $300 million” ($240 million in coverage) that would be made 
available once the Association had experienced a single storm event causing 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Figure 1. Figures 1–8 in this Article can be found at http://ealr.bclawreview.org/files/
2016/05/hornstein-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GWP-QFPG]. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See Kern, supra note 65 (“North Carolina’s hurricane assessment process kicks-in if losses 
exceed the system’s financial capability . . . , insurers are assessed based on the percentage of 
homeowners business they have in the state and the amount of writing along the coast . . . .”). 
 99 See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, INSURANCE INDUSTRY CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 12 (2001), https://www.actuary.org/files/catmonograph_june01.4.pdf/catmonograph_
june01.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT5M-XVG3] (“Generally, the liquidity (or illiquidity) of an in-
surer after a catastrophe does not cause insolvency . . . . It is the magnitude of the event and the 
fact that the company does not have sufficient surplus to pay claims that is the defining factor.”). 
 100 See Figure 1, supra note 94. 
 101 See id. 
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$1.1 billion in damage.102 Hence the nomenclature “xs $1.1 billion” (in ex-
cess of $1.1 billion).103 
But, on the weakness side, this $300 million layer would also require 
$60 million in assessments against member companies, as reflected in the 
left-hand side of the tower’s second layer.104 Put another way, rather than 
pay forward for coverage for the entire layer, the Association was promising 
to pay later, via assessments, if and when such losses came to pass; a strate-
gy, one notices, that is repeated in layers 3 and 4 as one moves up the tow-
er.105 Finally, although most observers might not notice it, the reinsurance 
layers of the tower have single “attachment” points.106 For example, the 
second layer reflects a reinsurance contract that requires a single storm 
causing $1.1 billion in losses, after which the reinsurer’s obligations for 
additional losses from that storm become triggered (the attachment 
point).107 Not apparent from such an arrangement is that, once activated by 
the single storm, the reinsurance obligation does not “reset” and become 
available for losses that might be caused by a second (or third or fourth) 
serious storm during that storm season.108 Considering that the 2004 storm 
season featured a record-breaking four named hurricanes that scoured Flor-
ida in a single year, it is noteworthy that the Association provided effective-
ly no “aggregate” coverage in the middle layers to guard against the same 
thing happening in North Carolina in its then-upcoming season.109 
North Carolina’s 2008 financing tower is an excellent reference point 
to highlight public policy changes that occurred in North Carolina in 2009. 
To begin, it is revealing that, despite the weaknesses in storm-loss protec-
tion already evidenced in the NCIUA’s financing structure, there was little 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id.; Glossary of Reinsurance Terms, CAPTIVE.COM, http://www.captive.com/news/news
stand/articles/glossary-of-reinsurance-terms [https://perma.cc/ANQ3-M6Z2] (defining attachment 
point as the “dollar amount under an excess of loss reinsurance contract at which a ceding (primary) 
insurer’s retention requirements have been met, and the point at which the reinsurance will respond 
to a loss”). 
 107 See Figure 1, supra note 94. 
 108 See MUNICH RE, REINSURANCE: A BASIC GUIDE TO FACULTATIVE AND TREATY REINSUR-
ANCE 25 (2010), https://www.munichre.com/site/mram/get/documents_E96160999/mram/asset
pool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/reinsurance_basic_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR4S-PDTQ] 
(describing how “per occurrence” excess of loss reinsurance covers “losses arising from a single 
major natural disaster,” but “aggregate” stop-loss excess reinsurance provides reinsurance “for 
losses incurred during the treaty term, usually one year, in excess of . . . a predetermined dollar 
amount”). 
 109 See id. 
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evidence of public concern before 2008.110 There were no political hearings, 
no corrective legislation, and no media stories about North Carolina’s rela-
tively soft financial precautions against massive storm losses. Given the 
financial devastation caused by the four-hurricane season in Florida in 
2004, and the even-larger financial devastation caused in Louisiana and the 
Gulf states by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, this is, in itself, noteworthy.111 
Although the point is perhaps too obvious to state, the situation in North 
Carolina reflected a remarkable political ambivalence toward future costs 
and possible worst-case scenarios.112 
Ironically, it was insurers’ non-ambivalence toward these same risks 
that finally got the state’s attention. In 2008, precisely because of the na-
tion’s massive storm losses in 2004 and 2005, Farmers Insurance notified 
the state insurance commissioner that it was preparing to leave North Caro-
lina entirely rather than participate further in the NCIUA.113 From Farmers’ 
perspective, and despite the representations in the NCIUA’s financing tow-
er, the Association had the legal power, and indeed the obligation, to impose 
on all property insurers in the state, a potentially limitless assessment 
should a huge storm cause massive property losses on the North Carolina 
coast.114 Insurers found it difficult to plan for the financing of these uncer-
tain assessments.115 Because a massive cash-flow problem could threaten its 
profitability, its obligations to shareholders, or even its solvency, Farmers 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See, e.g., ELI LEHRER, JOHN LOCKE FOUND., NORTH CAROLINA’S BEACH PLAN: WHO PAYS 
FOR COASTAL PROPERTY INSURANCE? 5 (2008) http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/policyReports/
beach_plan_reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/683T-HT9F] (starting to sound an alarm about coastal 
insurance in North Carolina in 2008 but referring to the “Beach Plan” as otherwise “little-known”). 
 111 See Ann Green, Storm Surge: Lessons from Katrina, COASTWATCH, Autumn 2006, https://
ncseagrant.ncsu.edu/coastwatch/previous-issues/2006-2/autumn-2006/storm-surge-lessons-from-
katrina/ [https://perma.cc/PB2C-YFBG] (“No one knows how North Carolina would fare if a 
devastating storm like Katrina hit. However, the state has one of the oldest hurricane construction 
codes in the country, first implemented in the 1960s and improved over time . . . [and] ‘[t]here is a 
low probability that North Carolina will get a storm with the water level as high as it was during 
Katrina . . . .’”) (quoting Spencer Rogers, a civil engineer). 
 112 See id. 
 113 See Kern, supra note 65. 
 114 See id. (quoting Jack Hannigan, Farmers Senior Vice President and Chief Marketing Of-
ficer as informing agents and policyholders that “Farmers regrets having to non-renew our home-
owners’ customers, but the current hurricane assessment process has forced us to make this diffi-
cult business decision”). 
 115 See N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, JOINT SELECT STUDY COMMITTEE ON THE POTENTIAL IMPACT 
OF MAJOR HURRICANES ON THE NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE INDUSTRY: REPORT TO THE 2009 
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 9 (n.d.), http://ncleg.net/Library/studies/2009/nr35.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89T3-B8FL] (citing Mr. Bradley Lemons, Nationwide Insurance, as noting that 
“the current system does not allow for any predictability in the amount of assessments and the 
inability to plan for a maximum assessment makes it difficult and expensive for insurers to pur-
chase their own reinsurance in the private market”). 
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made a credible threat to leave the state.116 Moreover, because the threat 
was credible, it quickly amplified into a politically salient issue.117 As, un-
der the Association’s structure, storm assessments were made on a market-
share basis, Farmers’ departure would magnify the market share of the 
state’s remaining insurers and amplify the assessments to which they were 
exposed.118 Other insurers intimated that they, too, would consider leaving 
the state entirely.119 The state insurance commissioner recognized this as a 
“ticking time bomb,” and the General Assembly created a study commis-
sion to consider statutory changes.120 
By 2009, the study commission had finished its work and the General 
Assembly had statutorily revised both the NCIUA and a related association, 
the North Carolina Joint Underwriters Association (or “FAIR Plan”), which 
covered noncoastal properties.121 At the coast, the NCIUA was to adminis-
ter the North Carolina Coastal Property Insurance Pool (the “Wind Pool”) to 
which the legislature made four especially important changes.122 First, 
member companies would no longer be able to withdraw “surplus” each 
year from underwriting profits the Wind Pool might record during relatively 
quiet, non-stormy years.123 Rather, premiums would be carried over as re-
tained earnings that, over time, could accumulate to cover the first layer of 
storm costs in future years.124 Depending on the details of their structures, 
the IRS increasingly took the position that, unlike the case with private in-
                                                                                                                           
 116 See DONALD L. GRIFFIN, PROP. CASUALTY INS. ASS’N OF AM., PCI STATEMENT REGARD-
ING PROPERTY INSURANCE RATEMAKING IN NORTH CAROLINA 3–4 (2011), http://www.ncleg.net/
DocumentSites/Committees/PIRMC/2011-December%201/PCI_Don%20Griffin.pdf [https://perma.
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 117 See LEHRER, supra note 110, at 5 (quoting North Carolina Insurance Commissioner-Elect 
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 118 See GRIFFIN, supra note 116, at 3 (“Since private insurers in North Carolina are statutory 
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 119 See LEHRER, supra note 110, at 7 (“Speaking with the author on a not-for-attribution basis, 
representatives of two other sizeable insurers confirmed that they had developed plans to leave the 
North Carolina market if conditions warranted.”). 
 120 See supra notes 110, 117 and accompanying text. 
 121 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45 (2015). 
 122 See id.; see also id. § 58-45-1(a) (2014) (“It is hereby declared by the General Assembly 
of North Carolina that an adequate market for essential property insurance is necessary to the 
economic welfare of the beach and coastal areas of the State of North Carolina. . . . ”). 
 123 See id. § 58-45-25(b1). 
 124 See id. 
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surers, retained earnings from some residual risk organizations such as the 
Wind Pool are not taxable but instead are allowed to accumulate tax free to 
pay for losses on the inevitable rainy day.125 Moreover, as retained earnings 
grew during the quiet years, it elevated the attachment point at which rein-
surance would be needed, thus lowering reinsurers’ risks and accordingly 
the prices of reinsurance.126  
Second, in exchange for member companies no longer able to profit-
take during quiet years, the overall assessment during non-quiet years, for 
which the industry as a whole would be responsible, was capped at $1 bil-
lion (still to be shouldered by individual companies by their particular mar-
ket share in the statewide property insurance market, the expenses for which 
are taken into consideration by the insurance commissioner when rates are 
set). Third, at the top of the tower, the Wind Pool was expected to create a 
financing structure accounting for losses that might be incurred in a severe 
storm season at the 100-year PML level.127 And, fourth, in the event of costs 
beyond the 100-year PML level, the state’s insurance commissioner was 
allowed to impose a “catastrophe recovery charge” on policyholders 
statewide, capped at a 10% annual surcharge on the cost of an insured’s 
property coverage.128 
To appreciate the difference made by these statutory changes to North 
Carolina’s storm-risk financing strategy, Figure 2129 shows the Wind Pool’s 
financing tower for calendar year 2012:   
                                                                                                                           
 125 See generally JAMES W. NEWMAN, JR., FLA. CATASTROPHIC RISK MGMT. CTR., FLA. ST. U., 
INSURANCE RESIDUAL MARKETS: HISTORICAL AND PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVES 54–60 (2010), 
http://stormrisk.org/sites/default/files/Insurance%20Residual%20Markets%20White%20Paper%20-%
207-22-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RYT-DZUX] (recounting IRS letter rulings and policies regard-
ing residual-entity tax exemptions). 
 126 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-25(b2). 
 127 See id. § 58-45-47(a). 
 128 See id; see also Figure 2, supra note 94. 
 129 See Leslie Scism, Insurance Pool’s Coverage to Coastal Carolina Ebbs, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 14, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125288603617007331 (“The state’s 
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the state-created “insurers of last resort” and line up resources to pay for it . . . . [F]ew legislatures 
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In contrast to North Carolina’s 2008 financial strategy, the 2012 fi-
nancing tower reflects a number of improvements.130 First, the top of the 
tower now matches insurance-industry best practices regarding 100-year-
storms by arranging financing up to the industry-standard 100-year PML, a 
severe storm registering $3.74 billion in losses. In contrast, as the top of the 
tower in Figure 1 reflects, the former North Carolina Beach Plan had ac-
counted for financing only to the $2.4 billion costs of a 1-in-49-year 
storm.131 Second, the bottom of the tower also reflects more solid financial 
footing.132 No longer are “retained earnings” and “company assessments” 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Figure 2, supra note 94. 
 131 See Figure 1, supra note 94.; Figure 2, supra note 94. 
 132 See Figure 2, supra note 94. 
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bundled together in an undifferentiated way, but instead retained earnings of 
$600 million are registered as on-hand and ready for immediate disburse-
ment.133 Further, the industry’s entire $1 billion liability is treated as the 
second layer to be exhausted in its entirety prior to any reinsurance, a finan-
cial strategy designed to raise the attachment point for the Pool’s first rein-
surer and thereby lower the rate-on-line at which the reinsurance could be 
purchased.134 Third, the Wind Pool negotiated with its first reinsurer to pro-
vide aggregate coverage, which meant that the entire $375 million layer 
would be available throughout the entire storm season to cover the accumu-
lated costs of multiple storms, not requiring each individual storm to reach 
the attachment point of $1.6 billion.135 And, fourth, at the top of the tower, 
the Wind Pool arranged for a catastrophe bond (cat bond), the Johnson Re 
bond, a foray into alternative risk finance that allowed for the purchase of 
coverage at a lower price than would have been charged by a reinsurer lo-
cated at the same layer.136 
Finally, before leaving the example of North Carolina, Figure 3137 be-
low reveals the Wind Pool’s 2013 financial tower, the latest nonproprietary 
data currently available that reflects further improvements in the ability of a 
state to arrange for storm coverage:   
                                                                                                                           
 133 See id. 
 134 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining attachment points). 
 135 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining aggregate coverage). 
 136 See Véronique Bruggeman, Capital Market Instruments for Natural Catastrophe and 
Terrorism Risks: A Bright Future?, 40 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,136, 10,141 (2010) (“[C]at bonds have 
a moderating effect on reinsurance prices and prevent reinsurance prices from increasing any 
faster than they did.”); Thomas Berghman, Note, A Market Under(Writing) the Weather: A Rec-
ommendation to Increase Insurer Capacity, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 221, 250 (2013) (“The issuing of 
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 137  Email from Alvin Ashworth, NCIUA Director of Finance and Accounting, to author (Mar. 
31, 2016) (on file with author) 
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worldwide in 2013.138 Its position relatively low in the tower (at least com-
pared to the Wind Pool’s previous Johnson Re cat bond) reflects the Wind 
Pool’s concern that reinsurers were not sufficiently competitive in their rate 
quotes given that 2012 was a relatively quiet year for storms in the United 
States.139 By arranging for capital-market financing relatively low in the 
tower, the Wind Pool sent a market signal to reinsurers that alternative risk 
transfer was, in fact, a viable alternative to traditional reinsurance.140 Third, 
the market signal was apparently received by traditional reinsurers. As in 
2013, one notices that at two layers of reinsurance (just below and just 
above the cat bond), the Wind Pool was able to acquire aggregate reinsur-
ance coverage, as opposed to only one such layer in 2012.141 Altogether, in 
2013, the North Carolina Wind Pool continued its financial strategy of ar-
ranging coverage ahead of time, through retained earnings, member as-
sessments, cat bonds, and reinsurance for a 100-year PML coastal event.142 
It is worth contrasting, although in much less detail, North Carolina’s 
storm-financing strategy with alternative strategies followed in two of the 
highest-risk Gulf or Southeastern states, Texas and Florida. Each of these 
states is considered at high risk for storm damage partly because both states 
have been located within many historical storm tracks and partly because 
each of these states has significant property valuations in harm’s way.143 A 
point often lost in debates over the rising cost of catastrophes is that mount-
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Tar Heel Re Cat Bond Grows to $500m, Follows Trend on Lower Pricing, ARTEMIS 
(Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/03/25/tar-heel-re-cat-bond-grows-to-500m-follows-
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 139 See NCJUA/NCIUA Pleased with ‘Enhanced Coverage’ from Tar Heel Re Cat Bond, ARTE-
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 140 See id. 
 141 See Figure 3, supra note 94. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See Daniel S. Wilks et al., Statistical Extension of the National Hurricane Center 5-Day 
Forecasts, 24 WEATHER & FORECASTING 1052, 1053 fig.1 (2009), http://journals.ametsoc.org/
doi/pdf/10.1175/2009WAF2222189.1 [https://perma.cc/37UY-SV5E] (showing storm-track proba-
bilities of hurricanes hitting Florida and Texas); see also Andrew Freedman, Top 5 Most Vulnerable 
U.S. Cities to Hurricanes, CLIMATE CENT. (June 6, 2012), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/top-
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ing outlays for storm damage reflect as much the value of what a storm hits, 
as the growing frequency or magnitude of the storms themselves.144 Thus, 
in 2013, Florida was second in the nation in the value of insured coastal 
property (the built environment), with a total of approximately $2.8 trillion 
in exposed property; Texas was third, with $1.1 trillion.145 In contrast, in 
2007, the value of North Carolina’s insured coastal properties was only 
$163.5 billion—reflecting the fact that North Carolina really has no major 
urban areas at the coast.146 
B. The Texas Windstorm Insurance Association 
In 1971, after Hurricane Celia reinforced the financial risks of storm 
losses, the Texas legislature created the Texas Catastrophe Property Insur-
ance Association, since renamed the Texas Windstorm Insurance Associa-
tion (“TWIA”).147 Perhaps no other state residual-risk organization has had 
such a star-crossed recent history as TWIA—the subject of class action liti-
gation, a special session of the state legislature, and a recent brush with re-
ceivership.148 Although there is evidence that at least some of TWIA’s prob-
lems may have been self-inflicted, TWIA also legitimately sought to devel-
op innovative methods of modeling post-event losses attributable to wind 
that otherwise had been the subject of years of post-hurricane “wind-versus-
water” litigation throughout the Southeast and Eastern states.149 TWIA’s 
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innovation sadly left them strategically open to a tradition of class-action 
litigation in Texas precisely because the innovation was designed to make 
decisions statistically across a class of insured properties.150 Despite these 
recent controversies, TWIA is an interesting residual-risk program to evalu-
ate because it highlights the use of policyholder assessments as a financial 
tool, and in particular the use of post-event financing secured by a stream of 
annual policyholder and insurer post-event assessments that was not reflect-
ed in the financial toolbox used in North Carolina. 
To some extent, TWIA’s governing structure has played a role in this 
choice of financing mechanism. Until very recently, TWIA’s board of direc-
tors consisted of equal numbers of insurance-industry representatives and 
representatives from those first-tier counties most at risk for storm damage, 
and three other members, only one of whom must reside in a non-first-tier 
county.151 Thus, even though TWIA could propose rate increases—subject 
to approval by the Texas Department of Insurance only if they exceeded 
five percent increases—it should surprise no one that coastal property pre-
mium rates remained systematically low and inadequate to cover anything 
close to a 1-in-100-year PML event.152 A 2011 consultant’s report indicated 
that rate increases of 45% on residential property would be necessary to 
cover TWIA’s exposures, and a more recent report in 2015 indicated that 
rates were still 22% below actuarially-fair levels.153 Although TWIA could 
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also set aside funds in a special Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund, TWIA has 
generally chosen to raise funds through public securities, typically offered 
post-event and secured by TWIA’s ability to impose a range of assess-
ments.154 To illustrate, the following financial tower, Figure 4,155 is one that 
TWIA considered in 2012: 
Figure 4—TWIA Proposed Financial Tower, 2012 
 
 
In contrast to North Carolina’s financial strategy, there are three im-
portant features of TWIA’s tower that is represented above in two parts, the 
left-hand chart being TWIA’s plan for financing the lower layers of its fi-
nancial obligation to policyholders (up to $2.8 billion), and the right-hand 
chart the upper layers (up to $3.15 billion and, if any funds remained, up to 
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$3.65 billion).156 First, compared to North Carolina’s 2012 plan (Figure 2), 
there is relatively little money on hand in the bottom-most layer, even in-
cluding the state’s Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund.157 Through a combina-
tion of low premium rates and a relatively active recent series of storms, the 
state had mostly spent each year what it brought in, leaving only $300 mil-
lion in assets, half of North Carolina’s bottom layer, despite Texas having 
much greater financial and meteorological exposures than did North Caroli-
na.158 Second, rather than spend dollars up front to fund in place reinsurance 
for the next levels of risk (layers 3, 4, and 5 on the left), the state relied on 
the sale of bonds, mostly post-event bonds backed by an assortment of as-
sessments.159 A focus on this use of bonding as a financial mechanism is 
discussed immediately below. 
Third, the top of Texas’ tower (right side) vaguely describes a financial 
plan to cover losses above $3.65 billion as “undetermined,” which was an 
amount far below the industry’s prudent contingency benchmark 1-in-100-
year PML event (which, by way of reference, in 2015 in Texas was $4.9 
billion).160 In short, a simple snapshot of TWIA taken in 2012, based on its 
financial plan alone, would have revealed a fairly contingent financial struc-
ture on which was based a tradition of chronically underpriced insurance 
rates enabling overdevelopment of the Texas coast in areas of hurricane 
danger, a we’ll-worry-about-it-when-it-happens financial plan for post-
event bonding, and no real financial plan at all for a worst-case event within 
the insurance industry’s 1-in-100-year PML planning horizon. 
TWIA’s use of bonds in layers 3, 4, and 5 raises three other issues. The 
first involves a matter of timing and whether the bonds are to be arranged 
post-event or pre-event. Prior to the enactment by the Texas legislature of 
House Bill 3 in 2011, TWIA could only issue post-event bonds, which in-
curred the risk that a serious storm would require financing at a time the 
bond market was weak or, as was the case with Hurricane Ike that caused 
enormous damage to Texas in 2008 at the height of the financial crisis, vir-
tually nonexistent.161 Second, the ability to raise funding after-the-fact helps 
to suppress rate adequacy ex ante, which only magnifies the moral hazard 
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that low rates will actually incentivize building poorly in harm’s way.162 
And finally, the various assessment pools available for bond financing raise 
questions of cross-subsidies and fairness.163 Not all of the implications are 
bad. For example, as seen below, under TWIA’s newest financing tower, 
“Class I securities,” the first layer of debt financing, are to be secured with 
assessments solely on TWIA policyholders.164 
At least in this situation, those who most benefited from the artificially 
lower rates caused by post-event financing will be the first on the hook in 
the event that more is needed. In contrast, in North Carolina, should re-
tained surplus not be enough, an assessment is made on North Carolina in-
surers generally (whether or not they write at the coast), a statewide finan-
cial contingency for which presumably North Carolina insurers obtain 
statewide rates. On the other hand, TWIA “Class II securities,” the next lay-
er in the tower, are repaid 30 percent by assessments on insurance compa-
nies generally (presumably accounted for in statewide rates), and 70 percent 
on a mix of TWIA policies as well as on non-TWIA coastal homeown-
ers/wind policies, coastal business fire insurance, and coastal person-
al/commercial auto policies, forcing those who did not benefit from low 
TWIA rates to pay for the losses suffered by TWIA policyholders who did 
enjoy those rates.165 Finally, TWIA “Class 3 securities” are placed on those 
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insurers in the state who are forced to participate in TWIA, again externaliz-
ing costs across the state for benefits received primarily at the coast.166 
 With this financial baseline in mind, TWIA’s finances since 2012 have 
improved. Due to a series of incremental rate increases, some legislative 
and administrative changes, and a few years of relatively mild weather, 
TWIA’s 2015 financial tower at Figure 5167 shows somewhat greater resili-
ence: 
Figure 5—TWIA Financial Tower for 2015 
 
 
Again, there are three noteworthy points about TWIA’s change of cir-
cumstances between 2012 and 2015. First, due to relatively mild weather, 
funds have built up in the bottom of the tower (increasing from $300 mil-
lion in 2012 to $600 million in 2015), and surplus funds also allowed for an 
enhanced reinsurance program at the top of the tower (now including 
TWIA’s use of catastrophe bonds as well), providing for coverage up to the 
industry standard 1-in-100-year PML event.168 But, second, TWIA still con-
tinues to substitute the sale of public securities after a storm event for hav-
ing enough funds on hand ahead of time through adequate premium rates to 
pre-pay for full coverage up front, as does North Carolina.169 Which leads, 
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third, to the danger not only that TWIA operates as a vehicle to enable sup-
pressed rates that carry with them the moral hazard of encouraging devel-
opment in harm’s way, but also the danger that a storm could coincide with 
poor economic conditions in which no one would want to buy TWIA’s 
Class 1 public securities or even its somewhat-better-secured Class 2 public 
securities.170 
C. The Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 
For the purposes of focusing on state-level catastrophe financing, it is 
instructive, lastly, to consider Florida, the state most at risk of suffering 
weather catastrophe losses.171 In 2002, Florida Governor Jeb Bush oversaw 
the creation of the state’s residual-insurance entity, the Florida Citizens 
Property Insurance Corporation (“Florida Citizens”), as an “insurer of last 
resort” allowed to offer rates only if they were “higher than the private mar-
ket.”172 But the possibility of severe rate increases following a series of hur-
ricanes that struck Florida in 2004 and 2005 led Governor Charlie Christ 
and the Florida legislature in 2007 to abandon that requirement.173 Rates 
were decreased, eligibility requirements relaxed, and a substantial increase 
in subsidized reinsurance for Florida Citizens was authorized to be provided 
by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (“FHCF”), a state reinsurance 
facility created in 1993.174 The predictable result was a huge increase in 
Florida Citizens’ book of business—it soon became Florida’s largest proper-
ty insurer, “with more than a million policies and $400 billion in expo-
sure.”175 By 2012, Florida Citizens considered two alternative financial 
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strategies to handle its worst-case obligations, depicted below in Figures 6 
and 7:176 
Figure 6—Florida Financial Tower, 2012 (alternative version A) 
In “Version A” of Florida’s 2012 financial tower, shown in Figure 5 
above, there are four salient features. First, rather than turn first to retained 
earnings (shown above as “surplus”) before considering other options, Flor-
ida spreads out its use of surplus over the first three tranches. Normally, this 
would come at a cost because it would lower the attachment point at which 
private reinsurance would first be engaged, and thus raise reinsurance rates 
because there was greater risk to the reinsurer of having to pay.177 But, sec-
ond, Florida gets around this problem by showing in its second tranche 
payments from the FHCF, the public reinsurance facility operated and 
funded by the state itself.178 The idea of having government-provided rein-
surance as a financing strategy has been criticized because it concentrates 
losses within-state rather than spreading them more efficiently globally 
through private reinsurance, but is not without rough analogs in such other 
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public insurance programs as federal terrorism insurance and California 
earthquake insurance.179 The FHCF in 2012 was capitalized at $18 billion, 
capital backed by the State’s authority to impose assessments on policy-
holders (not insurers) holding home, auto, boat, and motorcycle policies.180 
Third, Figure 6 also reflects the possibility of overlapping consumer charges 
to reimburse Florida Citizens for past payments, as reflected in the fourth 
layer, to impose on all Florida Citizens property insureds (alone) a sur-
charge of approximately $1 billion.181 Fourth, rather than turn to the capital 
markets for alternative risk financing, Version A of the Florida Citizens 
tower would impose at the top tier a $2 billion emergency assessment on the 
State’s property insureds. 
Florida also considered an alternative financing plan in 2012, shown 
below as Figure 7:182   
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Figure 7—Florida Financial Tower, 2012 (alternative version B) 
Alternative B in Florida Citizens’ 2012 financial tower reflects changes that 
were beginning to sweep catastrophe insurance markets worldwide.183 First, 
a huge surge in private capital flooding reinsurance and alternative-risk-
financing (cat bond) markets worldwide had so driven down the price of 
private coverage that Florida actively contemplated updating its financial 
plan to take advantage of this development.184 Thus, Alternative B would 
turn to capital markets to provide alternative risk financing through the Ev-
erglades Re Cat Bond (4th layer), perhaps reflecting increasing concern that 
over-extending the FHCF was exerting too great a drag on Florida’s credit 
rating.185 Second, for similar reasons, Florida considered going to the pri-
vate reinsurance market (4th and 5th layers), rather because the cost of pri-
vate reinsurance had become competitive with FHCF pricing.186 Third, in 
the 7th layer, the state began experimenting with the idea of a “regular” as-
sessment in addition to the 8th layer “emergency” assessment, illustrating 
the risk that, in Florida, policyholders were increasingly facing a variety of 
different and sometimes overlapping surcharges and assessments in addition 
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to rising Florida Citizens rates.187 In short, assessment-fatigue was begin-
ning to become a political issue in Florida.188 
But perhaps the most valuable insight from studying Florida’s ap-
proach to storm insurance is the degree to which “depopulation” has be-
come a major financial strategy. Depopulation is a program whereby a re-
sidual entity deliberately adopts mechanisms to shed its policyholders into 
the private market.189 Certainly it is not a new idea. In the mid-1990s, Flori-
da Citizens’ precursor began a depopulation program that provided bonuses 
of $100 per policy to new insurance companies willing to accept these risks 
for a minimum of three years.190 The results were unsurprisingly mixed, 
given the insurability issues that led most major insurers to abandon the 
private wind market in the first place. Many of the policies returned to Flor-
ida Citizens at the end of three years, and some of the new companies went 
bankrupt for lack of capital with the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes, “requiring 
the state to cover their losses through the state guarantee association.”191 
Nonetheless, with the election of Florida Governor Rick Scott, a free-
market-oriented Republican, the idea of depopulating Florida Citizens re-
ceived a major political push.192 In 2013, Governor Scott signed Senate Bill 
1770, designed to return Florida Citizens to its previous status as an insurer 
of last resort, partly by prohibiting subsidized coverage for new construc-
tion in environmentally sensitive areas and partly by creating a “clearing-
house” by which existing policyholders would be steered to private carriers 
but with temporary protection against rate increases.193  
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In the two years since, the extent of depopulation of policies from 
Florida Citizens has been remarkable; from a peak of 1.5 million policies in 
2012, Florida Citizens had shed hundreds of thousands of policies and, by 
January 2015, had plans to reduce the policy count to 670,000 (more than a 
50% reduction) within a year or two.194 And the most common political jus-
tification for the “takeout” movement has been freedom from assessments; 
both from the point of view of Florida Citizens itself (with fewer policy-
holders, less need to rely on assessments) and from the point of view of non-
Citizens policyholders who would not be tapped for some “Citizens-only” 
assessments once they were insured by private, takeout companies.195 The 
effect of depopulation on Florida Citizens financial strategy is well captured 
in the following chart at Figure 8196 provided by Florida Citizens in 2015:   
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Whatever the short-term effect on Citizens’ balance sheet, the long-
term efficacy of depopulation remains, in fact, uncertain. In the short-term, 
the chart in Figure 8 shows simultaneously a growing reduction in Florida 
Citizens’ policyholders (growing “depopulation” in the top layer), a grow-
ing residual-plan surplus, and reduced assessments.197 All of which, again in 
the short term, are good.198 There has also been a reduction in Florida Citi-
zens’ reliance on state-provided reinsurance through the FHCF, a positive 
step toward increasing the state of Florida’s credit-worthiness, and a corre-
sponding increase in private risk transfer through market-based reinsurance 
and cat bond mechanisms, which spread risks more efficiently globally than 
would have placement with FHCF and therefore are also considered posi-
tive developments.199 The question is the long-term sustainability of these 
gains. For the last few years, Florida has enjoyed a string of notably quiet 
hurricane seasons, allowing surplus to grow; independently, there has been 
an explosion of capital into reinsurance and alternative-finance market that 
has driven down private reinsurance rates, allowing both Florida Citizens 
and the new crop of smaller takeout companies to externalize their risks 
cheaply.200 
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As the rating agency A.M. Best concluded in a recent report: “[Takeout 
companies have been] afforded . . . the opportunity to capitalize on extreme-
ly favorable reinsurance market conditions.”201 Whether the private takeout 
market could withstand a change in circumstances is unclear. A flavor of the 
conflicting opinions on the subject can be found in exchanges between in-
vestors who acknowledge being “short” some of the takeout companies 
(and therefore have a vested interest in downgrading the companies’ pro-
spects), and those who admit being “long” (and therefore have an interest in 
defending their investments).202 Perhaps the most muted conclusion is that 
of A.M. Best, which said of the takeout companies as a group: “[T]here is 
significant risk in these strategies as proper risk management . . . risk ana-
lytics and overall infrastructure to effectively manage the [new] growth are 
in some cases untested.”203 
CONCLUSION 
Although the legal literature on storm insurance has focused on federal 
flood insurance and important, but relatively simple questions of rate ade-
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quacy,204 an investigation of state residual-risk wind entities reveals a more 
fluid and experimental set of approaches to the financing of storm risk. 
What remains unclear, however, is whether these experiments in fiscal fed-
eralism are evolving toward sustainable improvements in storm-risk financ-
ing or whether, despite their complexities, they remain for those who are 
drawn to the beauty of the Nation’s hurricane-prone coasts and beaches, just 
a shell game. 
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